Much of the resistance to arming the Ukrainian military in the Russo-Ukrainian War stems from a fear over Russia’s potential to use nuclear weapons.
Among the primary concerns is the worry that an accident might lead to nuclear conflict. The first thing that comes to mind is the incident where a Russian attack jet clipped the propeller of an American attack/reconnaissance drone flying over the Black Sea, causing the drone to crash. Although the accidental nature of this event is dubious, considering recordings of the jet in question dumping fuel and flying dangerously close to the drone, it exemplifies why conflict is unlikely to start in the first place.
That Russian jet chose to severely harass an unmanned aircraft conducting a surveillance mission, showing they were clearly unwilling or afraid to deal with manned American combat aircraft.
The other problem with this concern has to do with the chain of thought that follows if an accident were to blow up into a wider war. Let us assume that instead of a drone, a manned fighter jet was downed over the Black Sea. In retaliation, other U.S. aircraft would attempt to pursue the planes in question, while Russia would scramble to reinforce their own planes. It is not out of the realm of possibility that this could – should deconfliction attempts fail – spiral into a slugfest between American and Russian air and naval forces.
However, those who assume there is no line between conventional and nuclear war are misguided. It is one thing to strike back conventionally after you lose an aircraft. It is another thing to trigger mutually assured destruction over it. Neither Putin nor Biden have any desire to use nuclear weapons against each other, especially when the prospect of doing so almost assuredly means severe deadly retaliation. There are two exceptions to this rule – if the territorial integrity of either country is threatened, or if either country’s ability to use nuclear weapons is threatened (i.e. if the United States starts sinking Russian ballistic missile submarines), all bets are off.
However, conventional warfare between Russia and the United States in Ukraine or the Black Sea is extraordinarily unlikely to turn nuclear. The point is that nuclear powers can (not necessarily should) go to war without making nuclear war at all likely.
That is an important factor to consider when weighing diplomatic and military options in response to a given incident, whether it be the downing of an unmanned aerial vehicle or the arrest of innocent journalists and aid workers by corrupt regimes. Although military force should not be considered an option in all cases, when individuals (especially those whose work is critical to our understanding of a conflict or whose work is essential to providing support for victims) are threatened, captured and tortured as a diplomatic bargaining chip, we must weigh options other than releasing notorious criminals in exchange, and we must do it in a way that deters further hostage-taking.
That is why limited airstrikes against adversary forces should be an option. In the case of Syria, we have done airstrikes before, so doing more in response to future hostage-taking events is rather simple. In the case of Russia – a whole other bear, so to speak – we must clearly announce our intentions to strike at Russian forces in Ukraine well in advance both to allow time for diplomatic negotiations as well as to make clear we are not making a no-holds-barred entry into the Russo-Ukrainian War. We also must make clear that further airstrikes are contingent on the continued detention status of our citizens. Of course, there are countries that this would not work for (namely China, given its more powerful military), but we must begin to consider alternatives to our current approach – an approach that enables a continuous cycle of detentions of innocent Americans and exchanges for convicted Russians.
